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Abstract.  How would perfect competition affect the distribution of income in China?  
To answer this question, we integrate the two main streams of income distribution 
theory, namely the functional and the personal income approaches.  First, using a 
general equilibrium model of China comprising 30 sectors and 27 provinces, marginal 
productivities are used as competitive commodity prices and factor rewards.  Second, 
the rewards are imputed to households using their compositions in terms of persons 
and factor endowment entitlements.  The ensuing distribution is contrasted with the 
status quo.  Less skilled labor would stand to lose and, therefore, inequality would 
mount.  Skilled workers, managers and technicians would move from Western and 
Central China to Eastern China.  These flows would be more than offset by a flow of 
unskilled labor from Eastern China to Central China.  Our finding that Eastern China 
has too many unskilled workers, relative to the competitive benchmark, suggests that 
the  Harris-Todaro  mechanism  operates  in  China.    Competition  would  change  the 
predominant nature of inequality from the rural-urban divide to differences between 
the social classes. Moreover, the existing negative relationship between development 
and inequality would evaporate. 
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1.  Introduction 
There  are  two  strands  in  the  theory  and  measurement  of  income  distribution.  
Economists focus on the functional distribution of income, using the concept of factor 
productivity.  Their standard model features a macro-economic production function 
that maps factor inputs, such as labor and capital, into national income.  The factors 
are rewarded according to their marginal products.  Scarce factors fetch a high price.  
Inequality issues are implicit.  Basically, when labor is abundant, relative to capital, 
the wage rate will be low and, therefore, inequality is expected to be high.  In the 
other  “camp,”  statisticians  focus  on  the  personal  distribution  of  income,  with 
emphasis  on  the  measurement  of  income  and  inequality.    They  consider  personal 
income as given and analyze it directly, without the need of a production function.   
In this paper, however, we are not only interested in the actual distribution of income 
in an economy that becomes more market oriented, but also in the distribution that 
would ensue under the benchmark of perfect competition.  This issue suggests a two-
step program.  In the first step we find the marginal productivities of the factor inputs, 
since they determine the factor incomes under perfect competition.  In the second step 
we reset the factor components of household incomes and reevaluate the distribution 
of the latter.  The first step requires a general equilibrium model to determine the 
shadow prices of the factor inputs, while the second step requires detailed statistical 
information to express the rewards of factor inputs, such as the different types of 
labor, in terms of personal and family incomes.  This integration of the functional and 
personal income analytic approaches seems to be novel. 
We extend the model of ten Raa and Mohnen (2001) to an economy of many regions; 
we refer to the references given there for a review of the applied general equilibrium 
literature.    The  model  comprises  30  input-output  sectors,  grouped  in  agriculture,   2 
mining,  manufacturing,  construction  and  other  services.    The  standard  convexity 
assumptions are fulfilled, so that the welfare theorems hold and, therefore, a scan of 
the interprovincial utility frontier and an evaluation of the balance of payments can be 
used to determine equilibrium (Negishi, 1960).  More precisely, we let each province 
generate a domestic final demand vector (with the observed commodity proportions, 
assuming  Leontief  preferences),  but  multiplied  by  a  (provincial)  expansion  factor.  
We scan in each direction in the space of provincial expansion factors by maximizing 
domestic  final  demand  subject  to  the  national  material  balances  for  the  tradable 
commodities, the provincial material balances for the non-tradable commodities, and 
the factor constraints for the various types of labor and capital.  The shadow prices of 
the tradable commodities codetermine the provincial trade balances, which are used to 
adjust the relative weights of the provincial expansion factors, until a full balance of 
payments is achieved.  We follow the usual assumption that agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing  produce  tradable  commodities  and  that  construction  and  the  other 
services produce non-tradable commodities. 
China is perhaps the most dramatic example of a transition to a market economy.  Not 
only  is  central  planning  replaced  by  entrepreneurship,  trade  liberalized,  and  are 
millions of workers on the move, but what makes China particularly fascinating for a 
case study, is its starting point of egalitarianism.  The opening up to free markets of a 
right-wing dictatorship, is interesting from the view point of efficiency gains, which 
overwhelm distributional issues.  In China, however, there are serious equity stakes.    
China is thought to be more egalitarian than other developing countries and features 
less urban income inequality than rural income inequality.  How will competition alter 
the picture?  There will be winners and losers, both in terms of factor claims and in 
terms of regions and provinces.  Income gradients will press people to migrate.  This 
mechanism  will  take  some  steam  off  the  inequality  problem  that  surrounds  free   3 
markets  in  China.    Our  main  finding  is  that  inequality  would  multiply  under 
competition, but the predominant nature of inequality would change from the rural-
urban divide to differences between the social classes.   
We measure inequality by the so-called Theil index, which admits a decomposition of 
inequality in within-group inequalities and between-group inequality.  Normally there 
is one dimension of classification.  Location, profession, or perhaps income itself, 
defines the subgroups.  Our division of the population is three-way though, namely 
rural-urban, by province and by social class.  There is a naughty methodological issue.  
We may, first, divide Chinese income in rural income and urban income and, second, 
break  down  further  by  province  and  social  class,  and  then  decompose  inequality 
accordingly.    Alternatively,  we  could  first  divide  Chinese  income  in  provincial 
incomes and then break down each in a rural and an urban component and further by 
social class.  The problem is that the Theil decomposition is influenced by the order of 
classification.  We shall present this slight theoretical problem formally and assess its 
magnitude.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the general 
equilibrium model (an input-output model with a nonlinear adjustment mechanism for 
the weights of the provinces) and its main outcomes (the competitive allocation, the 
shadow prices, and the implied migrations).  Section 3 reviews the income inequality 
literature, extends inequality decompositions to multiple dimensions (rural-urban and 
regional),  implements  it  for  China,  and  investigates  how  the  general  equilibrium 
valuations alter the results.  Section 4 draws conclusions.  The details of the model are 
in Appendix 1.  Appendices 2 and 3 describe the sources of the input-output data and 
the population/personal income statistics, respectively.  The resulting population and 
income tables are reported in Appendices 4 and 5, where also a map of China can be   4 
found.  Appendix 6 explains how the functional rewards (generated by the model) 
have been transformed to personal incomes.      
 
2.  The general equilibrium model 
We extend the model of ten Raa and Mohnen (2001) to many regions, dividing China 
into 30 input-output sectors and 27 provinces.
1  Each province generates domestic 
final demand plus net exports, which are both 30-dimensional commodity vectors.  
The provincial net exports sum to the national net exports (in the sense of vectors), 
because interprovincial deliveries cancel out.  National net exports remain fixed in our 
analysis,  so  any  efficiency  gain  is  brought  about  by  provincial  specialization.  
However unrealistic, this conservative assumption steers the competitive allocation 
relatively close to the actual one.  Introduction of a free world trade assumption would 
complicate  the  analysis—efficiency  would  have  not  only  the  domestic  component 
captured in this paper, but also an international specialization component (ten Raa, 
1995)—and require even more data—the so-called Unit Value Ratios (ten Raa and 
Mohnen, 2002).  For similar reasons we assume Leontief preferences, denoting the 
domestic final demand proportions of province i by vector f 
i (obtained by scaling the 
provincial domestic final demand vector down to unity).  The assumptions of the first 
and  second  welfare  theorems  are  fulfilled,  so  we  may  determine  the  competitive 
allocation by maximizing the standard of living.  The conflict of interest between 
provinces is handled using the equilibrium analytic technique of Negishi (1960).  
We let each province generate a domestic final demand vector with the observed 
proportions  (f 
i),  but  multiplied  by  scalar  diD  where  D  represents  the  national 
domestic  final  use  and  di  a  provincial  share.    The  provincial  weights  di  will  be 
determined by the balances of payments.   For any vector of provincial weights, d, we   5 
maximize domestic final demand, D, preserving the commodity proportions in each 
province.  More precisely, for any vector of provincial weights d, the linear program 
described in Appendix 1 maximizes D subject to the material balances and the factor 
constraints.  The shadow prices to the constraints represent competitive commodity 
prices and factor rewards, respectively.   
The  determination  of  the  provincial  weights  is  as  follows.    For  any  vector  of 
provincial weights d the linear program determines provincial gross output vectors.  
Subtraction of the intermediate demands (as determined by the input-output matrix) 
and the domestic final demands (f
 idiD) yields the competitive provincial net exports 
vectors.    Valuation  by  the  competitive  commodity  prices  yields  the  balance  of 
payments of province i, for any vector of provincial weights d.  We adjust the weights 
following Negishi (1960).  If province i’s balance of payments exceeds the balance of 
payments  implied  by  the  observed  net  exports  vector,  then  the  province  under 
consideration exports too much and we give its domestic final demand share more 
weight by increasing the value of di, at the expense of the other provinces.  In the limit 
we  obtain  an  optimal  domestic  final  use  that  observes  not  only  the  consumption 
patterns in the provinces, but also their mutual balances of payments.   
We thus find the optimum pattern of specialization between the provinces, along with 
the  supporting  shadow  prices  of  the  commodities  and  the  factor  inputs.    The 
implementation  of  this  program  demands  an  enormous  input-output  database, 
comprising input statistics by sector and province for the commodities, capital, and 
labor, stock statistics by province for capital and labor, and a breakdown of the latter 
by  skill.    Appendix  2  outlines  the  data  collection  procedure.    The  data  are  made 
available by the authors upon request.   6 
The factor inputs are capital plus four types of labor, namely technicians, managers, 
skilled  and  unskilled  workers.    This  order  is  assumed  to  constitute  a  top  down 
hierarchy.  In other words, technicians are capable of fulfilling any of the labor tasks, 
managers can do their own job, skilled or unskilled work, skilled workers can do their 
own job or perform unskilled work, and unskilled workers can only do their own job.  
We assume free labor mobility. 
l
i
1 is the row vector of technicians’ employment coefficients in province i, l
i
2 the 
same, but of managers, l
i
3 of skilled labor, and l
i
4 of unskilled labor. The vector of 
outputs by sector in province i, x


























































All summations are over provinces, i = 1, ..., 27.  The first inequality constrains the 












This rewrite indicates that managerial demand is constrained by the sum of the labor 
force  of  managers  and  the  number  of  redundant  technicians.    Similarly,  the  third 
constraint binds demand for skilled labor by the sum of the force of skilled workers 
and the numbers of technicians or managers for whom there are no jobs at the two top  
levels.    7 
The four constraints pick up shadow prices as the model determines the optimum 
allocation.  The shadow price of the fourth constraint is the base wage.  The shadow 
price of the third constraint is the skill premium, the shadow price of the second 
constraint is the managerial premium, and the shadow price of the first constraint is 
the  technicians’  premium.    Technicians  pick  up  shadow  values  from  all  four 
constraints and, therefore, the competitive wage of a technician will be the sum of the 
base wage and all three premiums.  If, for example, the first constraint is not binding, 
meaning that there is excess supply of technicians, then the wage of a technician will 
be the base wage, plus the skill and managerial premiums, while the technician’s 
premium is zero.  The hierarchy of labor tasks’ fulfillment guarantees that wages will 
increase by skill (or at least not decrease).  Table 1 shows the baseline (observed) 
figures and the competitive results, not only for labor, but also for capital.   
Table 1.  Observed and competitive factor rewards (Yuan) 
  Observed  Competitive 
 
Base wage  150.62  25 
Skilled wage  257.87  25 
Managerial compensation  266.87  31756 
Technician' s salary  271.22  59361 
Average Rent (%)  0.79  0.44 
Central  0.66  0.22 
Western  0.53  0.17 
Eastern  0.98  0.59 
 
Sources.    The  observed  wages  are  the  October  1992  figures,  Yearbook  of  Labor 
Statistics  of  China  (1993),  Table  7-13  "Increase Rate of  Wages of  14  Cities'   and 
Counties'  Staff and Workers."  The rent on capital is the sum of depreciation, net tax 
and  profit  (taken  from  the  1992  input-output  tables,  Dept.  of  National  Economic 
Accounting, State Statistical Bureau of China, 1996) divided by the capital stock.  The 
competitive rewards are our model results.  Table 6 or the map in Appendix 4 shows 
the division of provinces in three regions. 
   8 
Although actual labor rewards already increase by skill, competition would have some 
dramatic effects.  The unskilled workers would receive a minimal wage of a mere 
sixth of the actual one.  The next type of workers, skilled labor, would do no better.  
Managers would earn a hundred-fold compensation and on top of that technicians 
would earn a big bonus.  Unskilled and even (lowly) skilled labor are abundant while 
the two top skills are very scarce.  The shadow prices reveal the potential returns to 
higher education in China.  Indeed, China now admits students to business schools 
and polytechnic institutes in great numbers.  Investments in such schools should pay 
off handsomely.   
The effects on capital rewards would be less dramatic.  Table 1 shows that the rates of 
return would even decline.  Since capital is assumed to be spatially immobile, the 
rates continue to vary by region. 
Table 1 reveals that the comparative advantage of the Chinese economy rests in less 
skilled labor.  If our assumption of fixed national exports were relaxed, the Chinese 
economy  would  export  more  skill  extensive  commodities  and  import  more  skill 
intensive commodities.  As usual, international trade would be a valve for national 
scarcities and remove some of the competitive pressure on income distribution.  
Table 2 shows how total income and inequality would shoot up under competition.  
(The Theil indices will be detailed in the next session.)  
 
Table 2.  China’s income and Theil index 






0.758   9 
 
The first column of Table 1 indicates that Chinese domestic income is slightly over 
80% of the level attainable under free labor mobility and efficient specialization.   
Tables 1 and 2 reflect the so-called dual variables of the program that maximizes the 
standard of living in China.  The underlying primal variables are the sectoral output 
levels by province and reveal the optimum pattern of specialization within China, see 
Table 3.  
 
Table 3.  Sectoral activity in provinces
2 
Sectors    Active provinces 
Agriculture  1  TJ, HB, SX, LN, JL, HLJ, JS, AH, FJ, JX, SD, 
HeN, HuB, HuN, GX, SC, YN, ShX, GS, QH 
Coal mining & processing  2  SX, GZ 
Petroleum & gas extraction  3  HLJ 
Metal mining & processing  4  SH 
Non-metals mining & processing  5  HB, FJ, NX 
Food manufacturing  6  SH, GZ 
Textile industry  7  HB, ZJ, XJ 
Sewing & leather products  8  SH 
Timer & furniture manufacturing  9  SH 
Paper making & stationary goods   10  JS 
Electrical power steaming  11  JS 
Petroleum processing  12  JX 
Coking gas & coal products  13  GZ 
Chemical industry  14  JS, ZJ 
Non-metals products  15  HB 
Smelting & processing of metals  16  BJ, JS 
Metal products  17  HB 
Machinery & equipment manufacturing  18  GD 
Transportation equipment manufacturing  19  TJ 
Electric equipment & machinery  20  SD, GD 
Electronics & telecommunications 
equipments  21  GD 
Instrument & meters  22  HuN   10 
Other manufacturing  23  AH 
Construction  24  All 
Transportation & telecommunications  25  All 
Commerce  26  All 
Social service  27  All 
Culture, education & research  28  All 
Banking & insurance  29  All 
Public administration  30  All 
 
Agriculture remains active in a great number of provinces, but most other activities 
are best undertaken in specific provinces, except of course the ones producing non-
tradable  commodities,  including  the  services.
3    Table  3  locates  the  comparative 
advantages of the Chinese provincial economies, revealing the threats and challenges 
they face.  
The  general  equilibrium  model  reallocates  economic  activity  as  to  maximize  the 
standard of living in China and this affects the level and mix of labor demand by 
province.    The  new  demand  for  labor  requires  immigration.    We  depict  all  labor 
motions in Table 4.  Positive figures represent inflows of workers or immigration and 
negative figures denote outflows or emigration. 
 
Table 4.  Labor Mobility in Competitive Markets (Thousands of workers)
4 
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A clear pattern emerges from Table 4.  Skilled workers, managers and technicians 
would move from Western and Central China to Eastern China.  These flows would 
be more than offset by a flow of unskilled labor from Eastern China to Central China.  
Demand for unskilled labor would be so big in Central China that even some workers 
of  the  next  rank  (“skilled  labor”)  would  have  to  perform  unskilled  labor  tasks.  
Western China would stand to lose all types of workers, if efficiency were to prevail.   
Our finding that there are too many unskilled workers in Eastern China, relative to the 
competitive  benchmark,  suggests  that  the  Harris  and  Todaro  (1970)  mechanism 
operates in China.  The argument is that high wages in the cities attract workers 
beyond unemployment.  The market failure underlying this distortion is wage rigidity.  
In view of the minimal competitive wages for the lowest types of labor, this wage 
rigidity has its virtue though.   
Our investigation of the efficient reallocation of labor is extended to the dependants, 
to  obtain  people  migration  figures.    Application  of  The  dependency  ratios  are 
discussed  in  Appendix  3  and  tabulated  in  Appendix  4.    Application  to  the  labor 
motions of Table 4 yields the net migration figures by region shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Population Migration in Competitive Markets (Thousands of persons)
5 
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Across regions, the positive figures (denoting immigration) sum to the same total as 
the  negative  figures  (denoting  emigration).    The  figure  is  33  million  persons, 
suggesting that free markets would exercise limited migratory pressure between the 
three regions.  There are numerous movements between provinces though. 
For  many  decades,  the  Chinese  government  has  conducted  a  special  system  of 
residence registration, the so-called “Hukou,” but the economic reform has granted 
more freedom to labor markets.  In recent years tens of millions of farmers moved 
around  the  country  in  search  for  work.  Wang  et  al.  (1995)  estimated  that  China 
counted 130 million surplus farmers and that the number will increase to 230 million 
in the next ten years.  
Table 4, the last column, reveals that over 18 million workers would cross the borders 
between the regions.  Inclusion of family members increases the figure to nearly 32 
million; see Table 5.  At the provincial level there are many more migrations.  In 
Eastern China, the provinces Tianjin, Liaoning, Shanghai and Fujian would absorb 52 
million migrants, while the other seven provinces would see 74.5 million emigrants 
leaving.  The net figure for Eastern China is 22.5 million emigrants.  In Central China, 
only the provinces Shanxi and Jiangxi would have emigrants, namely 1.3 million, and 
the other provinces would attract 33 million migrants, including 31.8 millions from 
Eastern and Western China.  In Western China, 47.6 million migrants would leave the 
provinces Guizhou, Yunnan, Nixia and Xinjiang, while the other provinces would 
absorb only 37.7 million persons, with the remaining 10 millions leaving the West.
6  
   13 
3.  Inequality 
China is thought to be more egalitarian than other developing countries.  The State 
Statistical Bureau found a Gini coefficient for China in 1979 of 0.33.  Griffin et al. 
(1994) gave an estimate of 0.38 for China in 1988 and found this low in comparison 
to other Asian developing countries.  Also, China was found to feature less urban 
income inequality than rural income inequality.  Zhu and Wen (1990) found a Gini 
coefficient for rural areas of 0.3 and Griffin et al. (1994) confirmed it to be 0.33, but 
only 0.23 for urban areas, all for the year 1988.  Wang et al. (1995) found that the 
1993 rural and urban Gini coefficients were 0.33 and 0.24, respectively.  The rural 
inequality derives from farmers’ non-production income, whereas staff and workers 
earn wages similar to the ones that prevail in urban areas, according to Griffin et al. 
(1994).   
Wang  et  al.  (1995)  ascribed  the  rural-urban  inequality  gap  to  unbalanced 
development—with  rural  economic  reform  in  the  period  1978-1985  and  urban 
economic reform in the period 1985-1994—but few studies have explicit results on 
the relationship between inequality and development.  Griffin et al. (1994) compared 
the rural incomes between all provinces and urban incomes between ten provinces 
(again for the year 1988), but were unable to ascribe provincial differences to the 
rural-urban gap.  Wang et al. (1995) found a 2.58 : 1.16 : 1 ratio for rural income 
levels in Eastern, Central and Western China, respectively, and found that the Eastern 
provinces show great income variation, unlike the Central and Western provinces.
7  
Similarly, a 2.13 : 0.89 : 1 ratio for urban income levels in the respective regions 
extended  their  finding,  but  their  analysis  was  crude,  featuring  a  “representative” 
province for each region.  Yang (1992) and Wei (1992) calculated the relative mean   14 
deviations from per capita GNP in 1989 for the Eastern, Central and Western regions 
(and the constituent provinces) with findings similar to those of Wang et al. (1995). 
Inequalities within provinces have been widely investigated.  Zhu and Wen (1990) 
and Griffin et al. (1994) calculated all provincial Gini coefficients for rural income, 
but found no relationship between inequality and the level of economic development.  
For comparison, we include their results in Table 6 below.  
Our own analysis is based on the Theil index.  We believe that there is good reason to 
measure inequality in this way.  Shorrocks (1980) examines the generalized entropy 
family of inequality indices, of which the Theil index is the main representative.  A 
deep theorem of Shorrocks (1988) shows that subgroup consistency leads inexorably 
towards  the  generalized  entropy  family.    An  inequality  measure  is  subgroup 
consistent if it fulfils an intuitive condition: a redistribution of income within any 
subgroup that increases subgroup inequality, however defined, must increase overall 
inequality when all other incomes are preserved, according to the same definition.  
This  monotonicity  condition  requires  no  additivity.    Strictly  speaking,  subgroup 
consistency yields any monotonic transformation of a generalized entropy index, but 
this  freedom  is  superficial;  a  weak  adding-up  requirement  eliminates  it,  namely 
condition (19) of Shorrocks (1988).      
Let total income of a partitioned population be unity (so that ‘incomes’ are shares).  
The income of g-group member j is denoted ygj, where g = 1, …, G, the number of 
groups, and j = 1, …, Ng, the size of group g.  Denoting the total income of group g by 






g N G G
g gj gj g
g g
g g j g g g
Y y y Y
Y Y
N N Y N = = =
+ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The first term is between-group inequality and the second term is average within-
group inequality.  The classical division is between rural and urban income (g = 1 and   15 
2, respectively).  Now refine each group in subgroups of sizes Ngh, where h = 1, …, H, 
the common number of subgroups, think of provinces.  Denoting individual incomes 
by yghj, j = 1, …, Ngh, and subgroup incomes shares by Ygh, inequality can be rewritten 
as  




gh N G G H G H
g gh gh g gh ghj ghj gh
g g g
g g h g h j g g gh g g gh gh
Y Y Y Y Y y y Y
Y Y Y
N N Y N N Y Y N = = = = = =
+ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The  first  term  represents  between-group  inequality,  the  second  term  between-
subgroup inequality, and the third term the average within-subgroup inequality.  Now 
we decompose inequality in rural-urban inequality, provincial inequality, and social 
inequality.  We face a nasty nesting issue.  Had we divided China in provinces first 
and  refined  them  in  rural  and  urban  areas,  inequality  would  still  be  the  sum  of 
provincial inequality, rural-urban inequality, and social inequality, but the numbers 
could be different.  Total inequality would still be the same, as would be the third 
terms, representing average within-subgroup or social inequality.  The leading terms, 
representing rural-urban inequality and provincial inequality, would have the same 
sum, but the division might differ. 
Let us discuss the data requirements of these inequality measures.  We need personal 
incomes by (rural or urban) area, province, and social class, both for the observed 
economy  and  for  the  hypothetical,  purely  competitive  economy.    Appendix  3 
describes  our  collection  of  the  population  and  personal  income  statistics;  for  the 
respective tables see Appendices 4 and 5.  The incomes under perfect competition are 
derived from the factor input prices obtained in Section 2.  We allocate these earnings 
to eight social classes, namely four types of labor (unskilled, skilled, managers, and 
technicians), the self-employed, the capitalists, the retirees, and, last but not least, the 
dependants.  The imputation of labor income is straightforward, but the imputation of 
capital  income  is  not.    Moreover,  factor  incomes  must  be  distributed  to  persons,   16 
taking into account family sizes.  We assume that the population division between 
rural and urban remains constant in each province, because we have no bridge table 
between input-output sectors and the rural-urban classification.
8  The details of the 
transformation of the functional to the personal distribution of income are collected in 
Appendix 6. 
The  inequality  measures  in  the  literature  (provincial  Gini  coefficients  for  rural 
income) are presented in Table 6, along with our own calculation for comparison.  
The first two columns give the province names and codes.  The third and fourth 
columns display the levels and ranks of the provincial farmers’ incomes.  The fifth, 
sixth and seventh columns provide the Gini coefficients of Griffin et al. (1994), Zhu 
and Wen (1990), and this study, respectively.  The eighth column provides the Theil 
indices  of  this  study.  It  is  noteworthy  that  all  measures  locate  the  most  unequal 
distribution of income in different provinces (the bold figures).  Income inequality 
measurement is no easy job!   17 
Table 6. Income Inequalities in Rural China 





















Eastern               
Beijing  BJ  2  1063  0.305  0.233  0.271  0.0553 
Tianjin  TJ  4  891  0.394  0.256  0.259  0.0521 
Hebei  HB  13  547  0.293  0.289  0.228  0.0459 
Liaoning  LN  7  700  0.330  0.300  0.254  0.0333 
Shanghai  SH  1  1301  0.222  0.215  0.312  0.0323 
Jiangsu  JS  6  797  0.383  0.299  0.282  0.0294 
Zhejiang  ZJ  3  902  0.286  0.298  0.266  0.0555 
Fujian  FJ  9  613  0.290  0.218  0.256  0.0245 
Shandong  SD  10  584  0.285  0.267  0.225  0.0484 
Guangdong  GD  5  809  0.306  0.305  0.249  0.0392 
Central               
Shanxi  SX  23  439  0.320  0.275  0.240  0.0431 
Neimeng  NM  15  500  0.339  0.293  0.245  0.0233 
Jilin  JL  8  628  0.354  0.264  0.247  0.0184 
Heilongjiang  HLJ  12  553  0.368  0.294  0.251  0.0157 
Anhui  AH  20  486  0.249  0.207  0.238  0.0267 
Jiangxi  JX  19  488  0.230  0.201  0.247  0.0280 
Henan  HeN  27  401  0.299  0.250  0.238  0.0230 
Hubei  HuB  16  498  0.231  0.229  0.242  0.0252 
Hunan  HuN  14  515  0.255  0.212  0.242  0.0257 
Western               
Guangxi  GX  25  424  0.291  0.279  0.234  0.0231 
Hainan  HN  11  567  0.276  0.283  0.253  0.0267 
Sichuan  SC  22  449  0.265  0.241  0.226  0.0276 
Guizhou  GZ  28  398  0.295  0.234  0.234  0.0167 
Yunnan  YN  24  428  0.287  0.259  0.236  0.0249 
Tibet  TB  29  374    0.279  0.248  0.0181 
Shaanxi  ShX  26  404  0.289  0.263  0.238  0.0275 
Gansu  GS  30  340  0.263  0.248  0.230  0.0262 
Qinghai  QH  18  493  0.313  0.325  0.251  0.0232 
Ningxia  NX  21  473  0.273  0.315  0.237  0.0240 
Xinjiang  XJ  17  497    0.323  0.243  0.0325 
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Table 7. Income Inequalities in the Observed Chinese Economy 
 














Eastern                 
Beijing  BJ  0.0553  0.0328  0.0372  0.0058  87%  13%  0.0430 
Tianjin  TJ  0.0521  0.0256  0.0321  0.0039  89%  11%  0.0360 
Hebei  HB  0.0459  0.0327  0.0411  0.0342  55%  45%  0.0753 
Liaoning  LN  0.0333  0.0401  0.0378  0.0187  67%  33%  0.0565 
Shanghai  SH  0.0323  0.0209  0.0239  0.0062  79%  21%  0.0301 
Jiangsu  JS  0.0294  0.0297  0.0295  0.0221  57%  43%  0.0516 
Zhejiang  ZJ  0.0555  0.0515  0.0543  0.0005  99%  1%  0.0548 
Fujian  FJ  0.0245  0.0905  0.0471  0.0189  71%  29%  0.0660 
Shandong  SD  0.0484  0.0445  0.0472  0.0016  97%  3%  0.0488 
Guangdong  GD  0.0392  0.0662  0.0512  0.0054  90%  10%  0.0566 
Central                 
Shanxi  SX  0.0431  0.0326  0.0379  0.0422  47%  53%  0.0801 
Neimeng  NM  0.0233  0.0461  0.0357  0.0296  55%  45%  0.0653 
Jilin  JL  0.0184  0.0455  0.0343  0.0235  59%  41%  0.0578 
Heilongjiang  HLJ  0.0157  0.0436  0.0323  0.0114  74%  26%  0.0437 
Anhui  AH  0.0267  0.0580  0.0379  0.0391  49%  51%  0.0770 
Jiangxi  JX  0.0280  0.0585  0.0377  0.0160  70%  30%  0.0537 
Henan  HeN  0.0230  0.0455  0.0303  0.0398  43%  57%  0.0701 
Hubei  HuB  0.0252  0.0355  0.0297  0.0218  58%  42%  0.0515 
Hunan  HuN  0.0257  0.0523  0.0346  0.0297  54%  46%  0.0643 
Western                 
Guangxi  GX  0.0231  0.0682  0.0371  0.0363  51%  49%  0.0734 
Hainan  HN  0.0267  0.1082  0.0668  0.0648  51%  49%  0.1316 
Shichuan  SC  0.0276  0.0467  0.0343  0.0257  57%  43%  0.0600 
Guizhou  GZ  0.0167  0.0628  0.0323  0.0259  55%  45%  0.0582 
Yunnan  YN  0.0249  0.0448  0.0316  0.0488  39%  61%  0.0804 
Tibet  TB  0.0181  0.1045  0.0484  0.0821  37%  63%  0.1305 
Shaanxi  ShX  0.0275  0.0393  0.0328  0.0587  36%  64%  0.0915 
Gansu  GS  0.0262  0.0407  0.0334  0.0804  29%  71%  0.1138 
Qinghai  QH  0.0232  0.0461  0.0365  0.0977  27%  73%  0.1342 
Ningxia  NX  0.0240  0.0372  0.0312  0.0771  29%  71%  0.1083 
Xinjiang  XJ  0.0325  0.0496  0.0424  0.0601  41%  59%  0.1025 
Within provinces  0.0324  0.0455  0.0380  0.0284  57%  43%  0.0664 
Between provinces  0.0243  0.0163  0.0208    100%  0%  0.0208 
Theil’s inequality  0.0567  0.0618  0.0588  0.0284  67%  33%  0.0872 
Within provinces  57%  74%  65%  100%  44%    76% 
Between provinces  43%  26%  35%  0%      24%   19 
In Table 7, the first column reproduces the rural income inequalities (from Table 6, 
last  column)  and  the  second  column  presents  the  urban  inequalities.    A  weighted 
average  of  the  two  yields  the  inequality  within  areas,  given  in  column  3.    The 
inequality between the rural and urban economies is given in column 4.  Columns 3 
and 4 are reproduced as percentages of provincial inequality in columns 5 and 6, 
respectively, while the sum of respective elements is reported in column 7, the Theil 
index of any province.  For example, in Beijing the rural-urban divide contributes 
only 13% to inequality, but in Tibet the share is 63%. 
The discussion of the national Theil indices at the bottom of Table 7 is quite similar.  
The first column displays rural inequality. A weighted average of all the provincial 
Theil  indices  yields  the  inequality  within  the  provinces,  0.0324.    The  inequality 
between the provinces is 0.0243.  The two terms are reproduced as percentages at the 
bottom, and they sum to 0.0567, the Theil index for rural inequality in China.    The 
explanations of urban inequality (column 2) and the weighted average of rural and 
urban inequality (within-area inequality, column 3) are similar.  A weighted average 
of the rural-urban divides (column 4) yields the Theil index for this inequality, namely 
0.0284.
9  Provincial inequality, be it rural, urban, or the divide, is given by the right 
hand side column, column 7.  Here the weighted average yields a Theil index of 
0.0664, which is well above the figures of the developed provinces, such as Beijing 
and Shanghai.  Addition of the inequality between the provinces, 0.0208, yields the 
Theil index in bold on the right bottom of the table: 0.0872.  This figure represents the 
overall personal income inequality in China for the year 1992.  Once more, the two 
contributing terms are reproduced as percentages at the bottom (in columns 5 and 6). 
Reading the row of Theil’s inequality measure, overall personal income inequality 
(0.0872)  is  shown  as  the  sum  of  rural-urban  inequality  (0.0284)  and  within-area 
inequality (0.0588), where the latter has been obtained by vertical summation of the   20 
between-provinces  (0.0208)  and  the  within-province  or  social  inequality  (0.0380) 
measures.    Reading  the  column  of  provincial  inequality,  overall  personal  income 
inequality (0.0872) is shown as the sum of the between-province inequality (0.0208) 
and  the  within-province  inequality  (0.0664)  measures,  where  the  latter  has  been 
obtained by horizontal summation of rural-urban inequality (0.0284) and within-area 
or social inequality (0.0380).  Either way overall inequality consists of 33% rural-
urban inequality, 24% provincial inequality, and a remainder of 43% social inequality.  
How sensitive is the decomposition of inequality with respect to the naughty nesting 
issue?  In the above analysis we first divided between the rural and urban areas and 
then subdivided between provinces.  If we reverse the order, the overall inequality 
would still be the same, 0.0872, but the rural-urban inequality would be only 28% 
(instead of 33%) and the provincial inequality 29% (instead of 24%); the residual 
social inequality would remain the same (43%), by construction.  Roughly speaking, 
without any pretense to settle this methodological problem at the level of theory, it is 
safe  to  conclude  that  of  Chinese  inequality  three/tenth  is  rural-urban,  three/tenth 
provincial, and four/tenth social.   
We now turn to the crucial question what competition would do to inequality.  Table 8 
presents our findings as relative departures from the empirical inequality statistics of 
Table 2 (ignoring the two columns with percentages, 5 and 6).  For example, the first 
inequality figure of Table 7 (rural inequality in Beijing, 0.0553) is increased by a 
factor 5.95.  The last ratio of Table 8 (in bold) is the most interesting one; overall 
inequality is increased by a factor 8.69.  The rural-urban inequality goes up by a 
relatively modest factor of 6.28.  The inequality between provinces is increased by a 
factor  4.90  and  the  inequality  within  provinces  by  a  dramatic  factor  9.88.    What 
accounts for this is the hefty increase in subgroup or social inequality by a factor 7.52.     21 
Table 8. Inequality Changes from the Observed to the Competitive Economy 
 








Eastern             
Beijing  BJ  5.95  8.05  7.23  5.12  6.94 
Tianjin  TJ  9.50  14.33  11.77  12.33  11.83 
Hebei  HB  4.24  17.85  10.90  0.85  6.34 
Liaoning  LN  35.67  9.52  13.74  10.13  12.54 
Shanghai  SH  19.06  17.13  16.62  4.92  14.21 
Jiangsu  JS  20.74  13.23  16.42  3.49  10.88 
Zhejiang  ZJ  8.71  8.95  8.62  118.40  9.62 
Fujian  FJ  35.90  3.77  11.75  10.92  11.51 
Shandong  SD  21.39  12.56  15.37  96.88  18.05 
Guangdong  GD  7.15  7.00  8.26  9.93  8.42 
Central             
Shanxi  SX  16.72  11.18  12.42  3.85  7.90 
Neimeng  NM  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Jilin  JL  55.56  5.44  11.54  9.28  10.62 
Heilongjiang  HLJ  55.64  6.44  12.22  13.18  12.47 
Anhui  AH  36.76  7.17  16.88  5.30  11.00 
Jiangxi  JX  30.36  5.73  14.38  11.62  13.55 
Henan  HeN  49.93  8.02  23.71  6.34  13.85 
Hubei  HuB  44.22  10.77  19.58  11.52  16.17 
Hunan  HuN  37.70  6.83  16.79  8.52  12.97 
Western             
Guangxi  GX  41.60  4.16  14.83  7.83  11.37 
Hainan  HN  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Shichuan  SC  45.99  10.03  21.41  11.27  17.07 
Guizhou  GZ  7.76  8.98  12.81  0.70  7.42 
Yunnan  YN  20.90  3.94  8.89  4.86  6.44 
Tibet  TB  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Shaanxi  ShX  39.41  7.62  16.24  5.58  9.40 
Gansu  GS  44.74  8.60  18.03  3.69  7.90 
Qinghai  QH  37.12  5.34  13.28  1.69  4.84 
Ningxia  NX  4.56  10.14  9.73  0.63  3.26 
Xinjiang  XJ  4.97  8.06  7.72  0.44  3.45 
Within provinces  19.23  9.14  12.57  6.28  9.88 
Between provinces  8.94  3.24  4.90    4.90 
Theil’s inequality  14.82  7.59  9.86  6.28  8.69 
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In short, competition would breed inequality but the share of the rural-urban divide 
would diminish. 
The  emergence  of  inequality  should  come  as  no  surprise.    The  Chinese  income 
distribution in the base year 1992 is egalitarian; Appendix 5 shows the small income 
differences  between  persons.    In  rural  areas,  the  highest/lowest  income  ratio 
(representing the capitalists versus the unskilled) is only 15.  In urban areas it is still 
only 20.  Each social class earns more in urban than in rural areas and urban mean 
income is about double rural mean income.  Shanghai and Guizhou are the richest and 
poorest provinces, respectively, but the mean income ratio is a modest 5. 
The finding of the literature that China has less urban inequality than rural inequality 
is not confirmed.  The rural and urban Theil indices are about the same (0.0567 and 
0.0618, respectively, see Table 7).  Within the two areas inequality varies quite a bit, 
essentially by stage of development.
10  In the less and under-developed provinces 
most inequality is in fact urban and, indeed, in the developed Chinese provinces there 
is less urban inequality than rural.  One might say that the literature’s finding pertains 
to developed China.   
Under  perfect  competition,  however,  urban  inequality  would  be  less  than  rural 
inequality.  (The expansion factors of rural and urban inequality are 14.82 and 7.59 
according to Table 8, bottom line.) 
So far we have discussed the inequalities within rural and urban China.  Now we turn 
to their differences.  The literature stressed the difference between urban and regional 
income levels as a result of urban economic reform.  We confirm this; the rural-urban 
divide is substantive (0.0284, that is 33% of overall inequality, 0.0872, see Table 2).  
Appendix 5 shows that urban income is more than double of rural income (all per   23 
person) and that all provinces except Zhejiang show higher levels of urban than of 
rural income. 
The rural-urban divide would multiply under competition (by a factor 6.28), but at a 
lower rate than overall inequality (8.69, see also Table 8).  Our analysis confirms the 
finding of the literature that Eastern China stands out in terms of income and that 
Central  and  Western  China  are  not  too  far  apart.    The  contribution  of  provincial 
variation  to  overall  inequality  is  significant.  Table  7  ascribed  24%  to  provincial 
inequality (0.0208 out of 0.0872). Competition would increase provincial inequality 
by a factor 4.90 (see Table 8), which is less than the rural-urban inequality increase 
(factor 6.28).  China’s income inequality between provinces will be relatively modest 
when they fully reap their locational advantages under perfect competition.   
Contrary  to  Griffin  et  al.  (1999),  Table  6  reveals a  negative relationship  between 
income inequality and economic development.  The figures in columns 3 and 4 of 
Table  7  indicate  that  income  inequality  between  the  social  classes  exceeds  that 
between the rural and urban areas in all developed provinces, in six of the nine less 
developed provinces, and in four of the eleven least developed provinces.  Rural-
urban inequality and economic development are negatively related, while rural-urban 
inequality correlates positively with overall inequality.  Social inequality varies little 
with the level of development.  Since under competition the rural-urban divide would 
become relatively less important, this explains why the negative relationship between 
inequality and development would be dissolved.  Inequality would be determined by 
differences in factor rewards that, at least for labor, would be independent of the 
province or the stage of development. 
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4.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented an input-output model to reveal the potential of the 
Chinese economy, including the supporting shadow prices.  The drawback of this 
approach is that a number of unrealistic assumptions have to be made.  Commodities 
are classified in 30 categories, assuming perfect substitutability within categories and 
perfect complementarities between them, declaring each either perfectly tradable or 
not at all.  A similar caveat applies to the classification of factor inputs.  Trade with 
the rest of the world is not changed at all.  Neither is technology.  Subject to the 
limitations, the model indicates that perfect competition would restructure the Chinese 
economy  severely  along  the  following  lines.    If  factor  rewards  would  reflect 
provincial or national scarcities, the less skilled labor types would stand to lose and, 
therefore, inequality would mount.  The flipside of this change is the potential for 
improvement  of  the  average  standard  of  living.    Optimal  specialization  between 
provinces alone, may add about 23% to the level of domestic final consumption in 
China.  Skilled workers, managers and technicians would move from Western and 
Central China to Eastern China.  These flows would be more than offset by a flow of 
unskilled  labor  from  Eastern  China  to  Central  China.    Our  finding  indicates  that 
Eastern China accommodates too many unskilled workers, relative to the competitive 
benchmark, and thus suggests that the Harris-Todaro mechanism operates in China. 
We  have  offered  two  three-way  decompositions  of  Chinese  income  inequality  in 
rural-urban, provincial, and social components, one pertaining to the observed data 
and  the  other  to  the  income  levels  that  would  prevail  under  perfect  competition.  
Competition  would  reduce  the  rural-urban  divide  (at  least  in  relative  terms)  and 
dissolve  the  negative  relationship  between  the  level  of  development  and  income 
inequality.  However, competition would skew factor rewards dramatically and thus   25 
create tension between the social classes.  Compared to the competitive benchmark, 
Chinese  policy  is  quite  successful  in  checking  inequality.    As  its  economy  is 
reorganized along competitive lines, skilled labor will prove scarce.  It should be 
mentioned that this result is a consequence of our assumption of a fixed trade position 
and technology.  Stimulating higher education and free world trade can alleviate the 
pressure.   
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Appendix 1.  The general equilibrium model 
We maximize scalar D, the overall value of national final uses, the sum of the values 
of final uses in all sectors and all provinces.  The variables exogenous to the linear 
program are: 
A
i  a square matrix of intermediate input coefficients, 30 by 30, of province i  
f 
i  a 30-dimensional column vector of the proportions of province i’s final uses  
e
i  a 30-dimensional column vector of province i’s net foreign exports  
d
i           the share of province i’s overall final uses in domestic final uses 
The  provincial  shares  d
i  will  be  endogenized  after  the  presentation  of  the  linear 
program. At this stage, the endogenous variables are: 
x
i    a column vector of province i’s 30 outputs (nonnegative) 
D    a scalar of overall domestic final uses 







Notice  that  the  material  balances  are  pooled  across  provinces,  meaning  that  the 
commodities  are  assumed  to  be  tradable.    There  are  a  few  exceptions.  The 
commodities listed at the bottom of Table 3 in italics are non-tradable.  For these 
components the inequality must hold for each term i separately.  The labor constraints 
have  been  described  in  Section  3.    In  addition,  there  are  27  capital  constraints, 






i is a 30-dimensional row vector of fixed capital coefficients for province i 
and M
i is the stock of fixed capital in province i.    27 
For each vector of provincial shares of domestic final demand, d, the linear program 
determines an optimal allocation of gross outputs and shadow prices.  Denoting p as 
the shadow prices of commodities, the overall value of the net exports to the rest of 
China is for each province: 
S
i(d) = p[(I – A
i)x
i – f 
id
iD – e
i],  i = 1, ..., 27. 
Compare this to the observed balance of payments, 
S0
i(d) = (1 ... 1)[(I – A
i)x0
i – f 
id0
iD0 – e
i],  i = 1, ..., 27. 
The equilibrium provincial shares will be determined by the condition that the two 
expressions match.  The combination of the linear program and the non-linear budget 
constraints  constitutes  the  general  equilibrium  model.  We  solve  the  model  by  the 
method of the Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP), which combines the linear 
programming with the Newton algorithm; see Brooke et al. (1998).  MCP solves the 
model effectively if a solution to the model exists and the initial values are selected 
near the solution. 
 
Appendix 2.  The input-output data 
National and provincial input-output tables 
Most Chinese provinces have produced square input-output tables in three versions, 
with 6, 33, and 118 commodities.  We consolidate the 33 sectors table into one with 
30 sectors by aggregating maintenance, repair and other industries, commerce and 
restaurants, and freight and passenger transports.  The tables provide intermediate 
inputs, value added, domestic final use, some interprovincial and international trade, 
and gross outputs.  To pinpoint the provincial final consumption vectors, we must 
determine their exports to not only the rest of the world, but also to the rest of China.       28 
Now  twelve  provinces  provide  separate  information  on  interprovincial  and 
international trade.  Their exports to the rest of China sum to 829,782 million Yuan, 
their imports to 898,960 million Yuan, hence their domestic net exports amount to -
69,178 million Yuan.  Net domestic exports in the 15 provinces without separate 
information  on  interprovincial  and  international  trade  must  therefore  be  69,178 
million Yuan.  We assume that the ratio of overall exports (829,782 million Yuan) to 
gross output (3,766,102 million Yuan) in the 12 provinces, which is 0.22, equals the 
ratio  of  overall  import  (58,596  million  Yuan)  to  gross  output  (2,663,441  million 
Yuan) in the 15 provinces.  Then overall import from the rest of China in the 15 
provinces is 585,957 million Yuan (and the overall export is 585,957 + 69,178 = 
655,135 million Yuan).  The overall export is allocated to the 30 sectors by their 
shares of net exports. The material balances then determine the imports from the rest 
of China. 
The trade data need to be further separated in the 15 provinces.  We calculate their 
shares in exports to the rest of China or the world and assume that these match the 
shares of exports to the rest of China.  This procedure disaggregates exports to the rest 
of China by origin.  The same procedure is applied to the imports from the rest of 
China. 
Domestic trade in the 15 provinces is disaggregated by sector by means of the RAS 
method.
11    For  15  provinces  the  exports  are  not  separated  between  domestic  and 
foreign.    The  provincial  budget  constraint  (see  Appendix  1)  requires  separation 
though. For this purpose we have constructed a commodity by province table. Column 
28, which is the sum of columns 1-27, shows the overall exports at the sectoral level, 
whereas row 31, which is the sum of rows 1-30, indicates the overall exports at the 
provincial level.  Columns 1-28 and rows 1-31 are the original data, while column 29 
and row 32 are the data estimated above.  The former are the overall exports to the   29 
rest of China at the sectoral level; the latter are the overall exports to the rest of China 
at the provincial level.  The data in columns 1-27 and rows 1-30 need to be adjusted 
such that the sum of columns 1-27 equals column 29, and the sum of rows 1-30 equals 
row 32 by the RAS method.  The same procedure is also applied to the import from 
the rest of China.  Once the exports to and the imports from the rest of China are 
separated, the exports to and the imports from the rest of the world can be obtained by 
extracting the exports to and the imports from the rest of China from the total mixture 
of exports and imports. 
Capital stocks 
The State Statistical Bureau has made available to us the unpublished data on capital 
stocks in the year 1992 for 40 industrial sectors by province.  We aggregate these data 
into 23 industrial sectors according to the sector classifications in the input-output 
table.    The  data  for  non-industrial  sectors  are  estimated  from  the  information  on 
investment in the China Statistical Yearbook (1993).
12  Here the classification is as 
follows: (1) agriculture, (2) industry, (3) geological prospecting, (4) construction, (5) 
transportation and telecommunications, (6) commerce, food services and storage, (7) 
real estate and public services, (8) health care, sports and social welfare, (9) education 
and culture, (10) scientific research, (11) banking and insurance, (12) administration, 
(13) others. Sectors (3)-(13) are simply aggregated into seven non-industrial sectors.  
We calculate the proportions of the investment in industry to the investment in these 
non-industrial  sectors  and  use  these  for  the  proportions  of  capital  stocks.    This 
determines the capital stocks in the non-industrial sectors.  The data on the capital 
stocks in the agricultural sectors are obtained in a different way.  The Rural Statistical 
Yearbook  of  China  in  1993  provides  data  on  the  number  of  rural  households  by   30 
province  and  on  the  capital  stocks  per  rural  household.
13    The  two  sources  are 
combined to derive the capital stocks in the agricultural sector by province. 
Employment and labor resources 
Information  on  employment  and  labor  resources  is  obtained  from  the  provincial 
Population Census in 1990.  The original data in each province for employment and 
labor are broken down into 55 sectors and eight types of occupation; we aggregate 
them into 30 sectors and four types of occupations. 
 
Appendix 3.  Data on population and personal income 
The population data in terms of the eight social classes (unskilled worker, skilled 
worker,  manager,  technician,  self-employed,  capitalist,  retiree  and  dependant),  the 
rural  and  urban  areas,  and  the  provinces,  are  directly  available  from  the  China 
Population Census (1990), except for the number of capitalists and self-employed.  
The data for the labor classes (unskilled, skilled, manager and technician) are obtained 
from the China Population Census Vol. 2 (1990),
14 where there are eight occupations: 
technician,  manager,  staff,  business,  servant,  farmer,  worker  and  others.    We 
aggregate staff, business and worker into the skilled class, and aggregate servant, 
farmer and others into the unskilled class.  The data on retirees are available from the 
other three tables in the China Population Census Vol. 2 (1990).
15  The first two 
pertain  to  urban  data  and  the  third  to  rural  data.    The  data  on  family-income 
dependants is obtained by subtracting the number of workers and retirees from the 
total population.  Because the population census data are in the year 1990, they are 
updated to 1992 using the 1992 population figures from the Statistical Yearbook of 
China (1993).
16  The data on the number of capitalists and self-employed are collected 
separately from the China Labor Statistical Yearbook (1993).
17  Instead of presenting   31 
the data on capitalist and self-employed directly, the China Population Census (1990) 
has them included in the labor categories.  Therefore, to make the data consistent, a 
number of workers corresponding to the number of capitalists and self-employed are 
subtracted from the labor categories.  Neither the China Population Census (1990) nor 
the China Labor Statistical Yearbook (1993) provides information on the occupation 
of capitalists and the self-employed.  It remains unclear how many of the capitalists 
and self-employed are either technicians, managers, skilled or unskilled.  We simply 
assume that all the capitalists and self-employed come from the skilled class.  The 
final data are presented in Appendix 4. 
The  first  step  to  construct  income  data  is  the  collection  of  data  on  urban  wages.  
Normally, this wage includes two parts: the money wage and the social insurance and 
welfare funds.  The China Labor Statistical Yearbook (1993) provides data on money 
wage by province and the data on the social insurance and welfare funds of staff and 
workers.
18  The urban wages must be further separated by occupation, as Chinese 
information authorities usually collect the wage data by sector rather than occupation.  
A  special  survey  in  the  Yearbook  of  Labor  Statistics  of  China  (1993)  provides  a 
section regarding occupational wages.  According to this source, the skilled wage 
matches the average wage, the unskilled wage amounts 0.584 of the average wage, the 
manager’s wage 1.035 of the average wage, and the technician’s wage 1.052 times of 
the average wage.
19  Applying these ratios to all provinces, we can disaggregate the 
provincial urban wage data by occupation. 
Most studies estimate that capitalist income could be ten-fold the wage of a skilled 
worker, and self-employed income four-fold.
20  In this research, we borrow the two 
ratios to determine capitalist and self-employed incomes in the urban areas. 
The data on retired income in urban areas are directly available from the Yearbook of 
Labor Statistics of China (1993).
21   32 
Spreading income uniformly within families and using a constant ratio of dependants 
to primary income earners, we obtain dependants’ income by dividing the average of 
the  primary  income  earners’  incomes  over  the  dependency  ratio.
22    The  primary 
income earners have the same net income left (after sharing their primary income with 
the family).  
The Yearbook of Survey on Rural Households (1992) includes data on national rural 
households’ income by education in the year 1991.  We define the occupations of 
rural  labor  by  education  as  follows:  those  with  educational  years  fewer  than  six 
belong to the unskilled, those with 7-12 years belong to the skilled, and those having 
over 12 years belong to the manager and the technician.  In this way, rural labor’s 
income can be split by occupation, even though the data are national macro data 
rather than provincial data.  The survey breaks down labor by education, but not in 
terms of income.
23  However, the survey has data on household income by labor 
education.
24  Using this information as a proxy for labor income by education, it can 
be derived that in rural areas the technicians’ and managers’ incomes are the same, 
namely 1.37 times the average, 1.34 times the skilled, and 1.59 times the unskilled 
labor wage.
25  (This estimate is consistent with the common recognition that in rural 
areas technicians and managers earn a high income, common to both, and that skilled 
and  unskilled  labor  wages  are  low,  also  at  a  common  level.    Technicians  and 
managers are paid urban wages, while the unskilled and skilled workers are residual 
claimants.)  By applying these ratios to the provinces, we break down rural income by 
occupation or skill, as well as by province.  
We estimate the income of rural capitalists and self-employed by assuming that rural 
capitalists and rural self-employed earn ten respectively four times the rural skilled 
wage, as we did for the urban incomes.  Rural retirees receive the same income as 
urban retirees.  The rural dependant income equals to the rural households’ mean   33 
income, which is directly available from the China Statistical Yearbook (1993).
26  The 
final data are presented in Appendix 5.  
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Eastern  BJ  TJ  HB  LN  SH  JS  ZJ  FJ  SD  GD 
Rural unskilled  866858  1107746  25642777  9326260  1053773  24566410  11576084  9612977  34129906  17959349 
Rural skilled  407383  222743  42559  845708  1575239  6859832  3667196  1524030  52544  2010768 
Rural manager  50628  26029  147691  130956  78436  574097  148838  80137  225585  129161 
Rural technician  84921  53553  565004  376870  164136  998949  398194  363176  835486  412357 
Rural self-employed  160865  95743  1653653  439673  104140  1101917  1456627  400015  2373151  1173421 
Rural capitalist  599  6649  14784  6364  4389  6507  16911  7085  13390  27492 
Rural retiree  33114  17375  273196  167245  148256  483125  178704  140144  341026  281656 
Rural dependant  1323908  1270754  22353882  8333590  1410663  19620942  11713375  12378061  24584733  19272202 
Rural population  2928276  2800592  50693546  19626666  4539032  54211779  29155929  24505625  62555821  41266406 
Urban unskilled  823183  720507  1973178  2645268  584655  1927493  2503955  947115  6645257  4256586 
Urban skilled  2460982  2156565  3419409  6220334  3298110  4975721  3870447  1654209  5251203  6199681 
Urban manager  376242  191158  358758  696926  282544  636791  262927  130018  457677  471232 
Urban technician  976299  594502  1024697  1597977  887702  1275515  915195  492557  1502633  1474986 
Urban self-employed  117804  46516  183928  472894  79090  210288  283895  242530  296721  763701 
Urban capitalist  15360  9342  6093  19782  11601  16385  17086  54533  16080  73095 
Urban retiree  724366  510376  542809  1592882  1350286  1110513  655528  329770  731107  1049934 
Urban dependant  2597535  2170440  4548201  7288136  2416981  4745513  4695051  2803633  8643502  9692481 
Urban population  8091771  6399406  12057073  20534199  8910969  14898219  13204084  6654365  23544180  23981696 
Dependency ratio  0.473  0.513  0.606  0.55  0.372  0.467  0.552  0.728  0.58  0.678 
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Central  SX  NM  JL  HLJ  AH  JX  Hen  Hub  Hun 
Rural unskilled  9270061  6707771  6975122  8178501  26467638  14856940  41049622  21130853  26863862 
Rural skilled  557680  275091  320164  511357  914910  956758  1025825  902474  1195240 
Rural manager  93304  61229  58740  108726  159854  112621  254606  151391  154599 
Rural technician  338984  240144  241584  351239  547337  445507  993937  528277  602401 
Rural self-employed  587676  193310  162505  152295  773824  590272  901166  654851  782226 
Rural capitalist  11717  1662  1004  380  3019  3256  8231  1387  5846 
Rural retiree  144714  60748  57175  165499  194696  202132  320295  168436  335698 
Rural dependant  10197038  6510231  6803037  9307183  18869465  13998329  30558240  16221241  21429096 
Rural population  21201174  14050186  14619331  18775180  47930743  31165815  75111922  39758910  51368968 
Urban unskilled  1084208  1024358  1100966  1975755  1750715  1271044  2401093  2897862  2024164 
Urban skilled  2376805  1954824  2854180  4361251  2680352  1875904  3497060  4361328  2801376 
Urban manager  278229  201952  295529  524770  283010  193682  417715  438279  323793 
Urban technician  729725  617411  858205  1240598  758248  592710  1074305  1288475  926929 
Urban self-employed  154958  230212  336786  464219  409499  312093  368858  279548  367627 
Urban capitalist  4615  4117  4778  9230  3326  3754  3943  4995  6902 
Urban retiree  324393  346321  616772  982098  494470  384179  566840  785556  620861 
Urban dependant  3635792  3640621  4633456  7746814  4029636  3330819  5168228  5985025  4229392 
Urban population  8588725  8019816  10700672  17304735  10409256  7964185  13498042  16041068  11301044 
Dependency ratio  0.734  0.831  0.764  0.811  0.632  0.719  0.62  0.595  0.598 
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Western  GX  HN  SC  GZ  YN  TB  Six  GS  QH  NX  XJ 
Rural unskilled  19173645  2314405  53560310  14653369  17370544  894046  13474257  10219588  1651373  1719946  4781473 
Rural skilled  147022  203049  1116132  160545  354377  43601  344610  59693  100307  29967  221014 
Rural manager  90158  16845  172154  51317  84298  12863  74904  54628  14611  12556  48400 
Rural technician  397080  78775  925725  237399  376764  49155  345036  198365  79054  48059  195241 
Rural self-employed  545070  66887  1374038  196583  397675  14862  407374  264199  28951  48185  174221 
Rural capitalist  3660  894  7410  4186  1394  1  4333  2280  361  469  1479 
Rural retiree  121342  108280  543396  73417  162615  8249  124473  37435  13518  11665  125893 
Rural dependant  16810368  2428165  30286707  11766952  13859138  994629  11942893  7213054  1515380  1732716  5123878 
Rural population  37288345  5217300  87985872  27143768  32606805  2017406  26717880  18049242  3403555  3603563  10671599 
Urban unskilled  889196  256836  5394754  1495736  1145500  33059  1023015  908238  112351  138315  538664 
Urban skilled  1485203  282638  5281343  1142853  1309144  43655  1946758  1248429  323520  333784  1156415 
Urban manager  191802  37609  426881  130045  132736  8748  233267  149210  37075  38742  145341 
Urban technician  524734  125216  1702855  427361  499168  25424  708435  413525  106240  121541  431536 
Urban self-employed  313935  91127  483389  186253  142059  25863  179326  105429  40952  27034  185482 
Urban capitalist  8002  14529  7721  4664  1331  16  3030  2844  563  1376  2900 
Urban retiree  325262  62107  1385758  257950  306219  10706  387123  194864  53891  56073  328993 
Urban dependant  2773536  772638  7311433  2821369  2176994  115124  2851035  2068218  531853  549764  2349076 
Urban population  6511670  1642700  21994134  6466231  5713151  262595  7331989  5090757  1206445  1266629  5138407 
Dependency ratio  0.742  0.882  0.498  0.774  0.616  0.781  0.636  0.684  0.788  0.767  0.842 
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The map is from http://www.chinatour.com/map/a.htm. Inner Mongolia is Neimeng.  We have 
delineated the three regions of Eastern, Central and Western China.  (They meet at the three-province 
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Eastern  BJ  TJ  HB  LN  SH  JS  ZJ  FJ  SD  GD 
Rural unskilled  1352  1126  587  856  1914  912  1169  846  691  1125 
Rural skilled  1610  1340  698  1019  2279  1086  1392  1008  822  1339 
Rural manager  2154  1793  934  1363  3050  1454  1862  1348  1100  1792 
Rural technician  2154  1793  934  1363  3050  1454  1862  1348  1100  1792 
Rural self-employed  6439  5362  2793  4076  9118  4346  5566  4030  3289  5358 
Rural capitalist  16097  13404  6984  10189  22794  10865  13916  10076  8223  13394 
Rural retiree  3128  2816  2878  2675  3416  2662  2858  2403  2635  3105 
Rural dependant  1572  1309  682  995  2226  1061  1359  984  803  1308 
Rural mean  1827  1429  720  1026  2433  1090  1524  998  853  1372 
Urban unskilled  1562  1125  1039  1071  2071  1290  801  1029  672  1084 
Urban skilled  2675  1927  1778  1834  3545  2208  1372  1762  1151  1856 
Urban manager  2769  1994  1840  1898  3669  2285  1420  1824  1191  1921 
Urban technician  2814  2027  1870  1930  3729  2323  1443  1854  1211  1953 
Urban self-employed  10729  7716  7115  7320  14174  8830  5494  7032  4598  7418 
Urban capitalist  26822  19289  17787  18299  35434  22074  13735  17580  11496  18546 
Urban retiree  3128  2816  2878  2675  3416  2662  2858  2403  2635  3105 
Urban dependant  2464  1776  1545  1618  3369  1993  1166  1502  916  1562 
Urban mean  2719  1935  1718  1876  3539  2183  1375  1910  1031  1890 
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Central  SX  NM  JL  HLJ  AH  JX  Hen  Hub  Hun 
Rural unskilled  539  578  694  816  494  660  506  583  636 
Rural skilled  642  688  826  972  588  786  602  694  757 
Rural manager  859  921  1106  1300  786  1052  806  929  1012 
Rural technician  859  921  1106  1300  786  1052  806  929  1012 
Rural self-employed  2568  2753  3305  3887  2351  3146  2408  2777  3027 
Rural capitalist  6420  6881  8264  9718  5878  7864  6021  6943  7567 
Rural retiree  2602  2403  2399  2462  2290  2130  2439  2179  2391 
Rural dependant  627  672  807  949  574  768  588  678  739 
Rural mean  664  670  794  938  569  777  577  673  736 
Urban unskilled  964  814  863  851  838  825  922  787  990 
Urban skilled  1651  1394  1478  1457  1434  1413  1578  1348  1696 
Urban manager  1709  1443  1529  1508  1484  1462  1633  1395  1756 
Urban technician  1737  1466  1555  1532  1509  1486  1660  1418  1784 
Urban self-employed  6585  5564  5908  5822  5738  5664  6316  5388  6786 
Urban capitalist  16463  13910  14770  14556  14346  14161  15789  13470  16965 
Urban retiree  2602  2403  2399  2462  2290  2130  2439  2179  2391 
Urban dependant  1466  1195  1288  1260  1178  1157  1322  1150  1410 
Urban mean  1628  1406  1538  1488  1456  1426  1541  1295  1685 
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Western  GX  HN  SC  GZ  YN  TB  Six  GS  QH  NX  XJ 
Rural unskilled  630  725  545  435  531  714  481  421  519  508  636 
Rural skilled  750  863  649  518  633  850  572  501  617  605  758 
Rural manager  1003  1155  869  693  847  1137  766  670  826  810  1014 
Rural technician  1003  1155  869  693  847  1137  766  670  826  810  1014 
Rural self-employed  2998  3453  2597  2073  2531  3400  2290  2003  2470  2421  3031 
Rural capitalist  7496  8632  6492  5181  6328  8499  5724  5007  6175  6052  7578 
Rural retiree  2519  2279  2300  2394  2825  3956  2422  2905  3533  2741  2760 
Rural dependant  732  843  634  506  618  830  559  489  603  591  740 
Rural mean  723  862  624  487  610  820  559  481  597  587  762 
Urban unskilled  1038  1382  821  642  1091  1734  972  1026  1301  1143  1253 
Urban skilled  1778  2367  1405  1100  1868  2969  1663  1756  2228  1957  2145 
Urban manager  1840  2450  1455  1139  1934  3072  1721  1818  2305  2026  2220 
Urban technician  1870  2490  1478  1157  1965  3123  1750  1848  2343  2059  2256 
Urban self-employed  7130  9467  5624  4403  7482  11894  6641  7033  8885  7831  8550 
Urban capitalist  17825  23667  14060  11008  18704  29735  16604  17583  22213  19578  21375 
Urban retiree  2519  2279  2300  2394  2825  3956  2422  2905  3533  2741  2760 
Urban dependant  1460  2042  1135  861  1536  2159  1445  1488  1957  1756  1830 
Urban mean  1866  2650  1332  1048  1791  3398  1660  1688  2328  1972  2200 





Appendix 6. Transforming competitive functional into personal incomes 
Let IK
j
s denote capital income, where j = 1, ..., 27 represent provinces and s = 1, ..., 
30 sectors. Let K and ￿ denote employed capital and rental rates. Capital income in the 






Capital  income  in  the  sectors  of  industry,  construction,  transports  and 










Capital income in the sectors of public service, culture and education, finance and 









= ￿  
The model determines directly the unskilled wage rate and the wage premiums for the 
technicians, the managers, and the skilled. 
In  the  agricultural  sector,  all  capital  belongs  to  farmers,  who,  however,  are  not 
capitalists.    The  rural  capitalists  hold  their  capital  in  sectors  such  as  industry, 
commerce and construction.  Capital income in the agricultural sector is distributed to 
all farmers who hold own capital, whereas the rural capitalists receive rent in non-
agricultural sectors. 
State  and  private  capital  exist  mainly  in  the  sectors  of  industry,  commerce,  and 
construction.  Using the data on capital ownership in industrial sectors by province 
from  The  Third  National  Industrial  Census  of  China  in  1995,  we  calculate  the 
proportions of private capital in total capital, and apply them to the data in 1992 to get 
the amounts of private capital in industrial sectors for 1992.  Since the data on capital 
ownership in commerce and construction sectors are unavailable, we assume that the  
 
42 
private share of total capital is the same as in the industrial sector.  Public service, 
education and culture, finance and banking, and administration are dominated by state 
capital.  We assume that the government collects all capital income in these sectors. 
Not many people own capital, let alone rely on it for income.  We simply assume that 
all  private  capital  income  accrues  to  the  people  who  own  significant  amounts  of 
capital, the capitalists.  The capitalists’ income is separated from total capital income, 
which  includes  both  government  and  private  capital  incomes,  according  to  the 





j where ￿ is the share of 
private capital income in total capital income, I the capitalists’ average income, and N 
the number of capitalists, all indexed by province, j. 
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1 We miss Neimeng, Hainan, and Tibet because of input-output data problems.  Fortunately, 
these are not populous provinces.  
2 The sectors producing non-tradable commodities are denoted in italics.  See Table 6 for 
province codes. 
3 The efficient allocation of sectoral activities features specialization.  Notice that we use an 
idealized concept of free interprovincial trade, neglecting trade frictions such as transportation 
costs  over  and  above  the  ones  captured  in  the  intersectoral  input-output  statistics.    The 
availability and incorporation of data on such frictions would generate a more diversified 
competitive allocation, including for agriculture.     
4 The figures are differences between competitive and observed labor employments.  Hence 
they represent inflows of workers or immigration.  Figures need not add due to rounding.   
5 Figures need not add due to rounding.   
6 Because Neimeng, Hainan and Tibet do not participate in the competitive market, their 
populations will remain constant in this research. 
7 See the map in Appendix 4 or Table 6 for the division of provinces.  
8 Rural China has many industries other than agriculture. 
9 Notice that the variation of this statistic between provinces is meaningless; this is why Table 
2 has an empty cell in column 4. 
10 In 1994, the Eastern provinces (see Table 6 for the classification) were home to 36.5% of 
China' s population but contributed 55.6% to national GDP.  (The data are from the 1995 
China Statistical Yearbook.)  Per capita GDP for the east coast was 5720 Yuan.  The Central  
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provinces were home to 35.6% of China' s population and contributed 27.6% to national GDP.  
Per capita GDP in the Central part was 2913 Yuan.  The Western provinces were home to 
27.9% of China' s population but contributed 16.8% to national GDP.  Per capita GDP in the 
Western  part  was  260  Yuan.  The  Eastern,  Central  and  Western  parts  are  referred  to  as 
developed, less-developed and under-developed zones, respectively. 
11 For the RAS method, see Bacharach (1970). 
12 See Tables 5-23 "Investment in Capital Construction by Sector of National Economy and 
Province in 1992" and 5-43 "Investment in Technical Updating and Transformation by Sector 
of National Economy and Province in 1992." 
13 See Table 4-3 "Rural Households and Population by Province in 1992" for the data on the 
number of rural households by province, and Table 3-24 "Original Value of Fixed Assets for 
Production Per Rural Household by Province" for the information on capital stocks per rural 
household. 
14  Table  6-15  "City  Working  Persons  by  Two  Digits  Classification  of  Occupation  and 
Province", Table 6-16 "Town Working Persons by Two Digits Classification of Occupation 
and Province", and Table 6-17 "County Working Persons by Two Digits Classification of 
Occupation and Province" in the China Population Census Vol. 2 (1990).  Among the three, 
the first two are for urban data, and the third is for rural data. 
15 Table 6-28 "City Non-working Persons by Province", Table 6-29 "Town Non-working 
Persons by Province", and Table 6-30 "County Non-working Persons by Province" in the 
China Population Census Vol. 2 (1990). 
16  Table  3-3  "Total  Population,  Birth  Rate,  Death  Rate,  and  Natural  Growth  Rate  of 
Population by Province, 1992" in the Statistical Yearbook of China (1993). 
17  Table  6-3  "Urban  Employment  in  Private  Enterprises  and  Individual  Households  by 
Province"  and  Table  6-4  "Rural  Employment  in  Private  Enterprises  and  Individual 
Households by Province" in the China Labor Statistical Yearbook (1993). 
18 In the China Labor Statistical Yearbook (1993) see Table 1-65 "Number and Total Wage 
Bill of Staff and Workers by Province."  The social insurance and welfare funds are presented 
in four other separate tables, Table 9-20 "Composition of Total Social Insurance and Welfare 
Funds of Staff and Workers in State-owned Units by Province", Table 9-31 "Composition of 
Total Social Insurance and Welfare Funds of Staff and Workers in Urban Collectively-owned 
Units by Province", Table 9-34 "Composition of Total Social Insurance and Welfare Funds of 
Staff and Workers in Units of Other Ownership by Province", and Table 9-36 "Composition 
of  Total  Social  Insurance  and  Welfare  Funds  of  Staff  and  Workers  in  Foreign  Funded 
Enterprises by Province".  The average of these tables is the total social insurance and welfare 
funds of staff and workers by province. 
19 In the Yearbook of Labor Statistics of China (1993), Table 7-13 "Increase Rate of Wages of 
14  Cities'   and  Counties'   Staff  and  Workers"  gives  the  average  wages  by  occupation  in 
October, 1992 as follows: unskilled 150.62 Yuan, skilled 257.87 Yuan, technician 271.22 
Yuan, and manager 266.87 Yuan.  In other words, the technician' s wage is 1.016 over the 
manager' s wage, 1.052 over the skilled, and 1.8 over the unskilled.  Since the average of the 
wages is 257.89 Yuan, it can be seen that the unskilled worker' s wage equals 0.584 of the  
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average, the skilled worker' s wage equals the average, the manager' s wage equals 1.035 of the 
average, and the technician' s wage equals 1.052 of the average. 
20 See Zhong (1989), Yang and Shao (1989), Chu (1990), Li (1990), Luo (1989), and Zhao 
(1992). 
21 In the Yearbook of Labor Statistics of China (1993), there are four tables used: Table 9-25 
Composition  of  Total  Social  Insurance  and  Welfare  Funds  of  Staff  and  Workers  under 
Termination,  Retirement  and  Resignation  in  State-owned  Units  by  Province",  Table  9-32 
"Composition  of  Total  Social  Insurance  and  Welfare  Funds  of  Staff  and  Workers  under 
Termination, Retirement and Resignation in Urban Collectively owned Units by Province", 
Table 9-35 "Composition of Total Social Insurance and Welfare Funds of  Staff and Workers 
under Termination, Retirement and Resignation in Units of Other Ownership by Province", 
and  Table  9-37  "Composition  of  Total  Social  Insurance  and  Welfare  Funds  of  Staff  and 
Workers under Termination, Retirement and Resignation in Foreign Funded Enterprises by 
Province".  The weighted averages of the incomes in these tables are calculated to get the 
retired income in urban areas. 
22 We assume that retirees cannot afford dependants. 
23 Table 3-2 "Rural Labors'  Quality by province" in the survey. 
24 Table 2-5 "The Main Indicators of Rural Households by Labor' s Education" in the survey. 
25 As a result, unskilled income is 611.67 Yuan, skilled 725.83 Yuan, and Manager' s and 
Technician' s 971.56 Yuan.  The average income of rural households, moreover, is 708.55 
Yuan in 1991.  Assuming that technician and manager' s incomes are equal, their income is 
1.37 times more than the average, 1.34 times more than the skilled, and 1.59 more than the 
unskilled.  The skilled income is 1.19 times more than the unskilled. 
26 Table 8-23 "Net Income of Peasant Household Per Capita by Province" in China Statistical 
Yearbook (1993). 
27 See Table 6 for province codes. 
28 See Table 6 for province codes. 